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Determinants of IFRS Compliance in Africa: 
Analysis of Stakeholder Attributes 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: This paper examines the drivers of companies’ compliance with IFRS using the 
stakeholder salience theory. 
Research Methods: We have used panel data from 205 companies to examine the IFRS 
compliance level across 13 African countries. Our study has also established the relationship 
between stakeholders’ attributes and firms’ compliance with IFRS.  
Findings: On IFRS compliance, we found that the average compliance score among the 
companies over the period was 73.09% with a minimum score of 62.86% and maximum of 
85.61%. We found a significant positive association between audit committee competence 
(ACC) and compliance and found the same for chartered accountants on board (AOB). There 
is less compliance with the latest standards, such as IFRS 3, 7, and 13. Also, IAS 17, 19, 36, 
and 37 are problematic across the sample. We also found that compliance has been increasing 
over the years.  
Practical implications. For companies, our studies provide empirical evidence on the 
importance of having chartered accountants’ corporate boards as well as competent audit 
committees involved in ensuring high compliance with IFRS. Our findings also provide 
valuable information for professional accounting organizations on the role of its members 
(chartered accountants) in the effectiveness of IFRS compliance. 
Value/Contribution: This study complements and updates prior studies on IFRS compliance 
with findings from Africa, a region that has been neglected in the literature.  
It provides empirical evidence on the importance of chartered accountants sitting on corporate 
boards in ensuring high compliance with IFRS. 
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1.0. Introduction. 
The high speed of accounting harmonization makes International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) an unstoppable phenomenon, yet concerns have been raised as to whether 
countries’ claims of IFRS adoption has being translated accurately into their financial 
statements (Ball, 2016; Nobes, 2013, 2011).  
Based on positive accounting theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986), prior studies by Al-
Mutawaa & Hewiady, (2010), Al-Shammari et al. (2008), Alsaeed, (2006), and Karim and 
Ahmed, (2005) have provided evidence of the relationship between firm characteristics and 
compliance level. However, these studies ignore the fact that companies can be forced to adopt 
IFRS but its compliance rests in the hands of management who act according to the directions 
of the stakeholders involved. We argue that compliance with IFRS at the firm level is more 
related to how stakeholders ‘influence companies’ reporting activities than firm-specific 
characteristics. This connection is very relevant in African countries where the stock market is 
not efficient to reflect external reporting. Hence, only some stakeholders may be interested in 
the company’s accounting practices due to power, legitimacy, or urgency.  
Africa provides unique settings and motivation for this research because of the following 
features. It is the host of emerging countries that have been beset by low compliance with 
global standards (Word Bank ROSC, Nobes, 2011) due to their weak institutional and 
enforcement framework (Bova & Pereira 2012). Also, Africa is mostly neglected in prior 
research. More important, due to its low economic growth, the stock market is not central to 
the development of most African countries (Nnadi & Soobaroyen, 2015). 
Further, as argued by Gordon et al. (2012), Nnadi and Soobaroyen (2015), companies in 
developing economies have different ownership, financing, and governance structure 
compared to those in developed ones (see also La-Porta et al. 1999). Contrary to companies in 
Europe, the Americas and other parts of the world where ownership is dispersed among many 
active minority shareholders, ownership in most African companies is dominated by blocks 
and internal holdings. The few external holders are not active participants on the exchanges. 
African firms heavily depend on finance outside stock exchanges and more likely to respond 
to factors outside the capital market (Ntim 2013). This feature contrasts with most companies 
outside Africa, which usually secure funding on stock exchanges. 
Consequently, there can be heterogeneity in compliance with IFRS. Thus, these features allow 
us to answer the distinct question, what are the drivers of IFRS compliance outside the capital 
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market theories? We argue that because most African companies’ source finance outside the 
capital market, their level of compliance and associated factors will differ from prior studies 
on Europe, America, and Asia. Thus, African companies will not necessarily comply with IFRS 
for direct benefit in the capital as opined in existing literature.  
Another point of difference in our study is the incorporation of adoption timing. The differences 
in adoption years allow us to examine the impact of years of IFRS experience on the level of 
compliance. Arguably, how long a country has been using IFRS is likely to impact compliance 
level; for example, the longer the years, the higher the compliance level. Despite this strong 
relationship, prior studies have not considered it.  
To achieve our objective of examining determinants of IFRS compliance outside the capital 
market theories, we used a sample of 205 companies across 13 African countries. We also 
established the relationship between stakeholders’ attributes and firm’s compliance with IFRS 
through the stakeholder salience theory. In this study, we defined IFRS adopted countries as 
countries that mandatorily require all listed companies to report per IFRS as issued by IASB. 
 The average compliance score among the companies over the period was 70.94% (73.09%), 
with a minimum score of 58.59% (62.86%) and maximum of 83.55% (85.61%). Our results 
show that there is a significant positive association between audit committee competence 
(ACC), and compliance, and the same for chartered accountants on corporate boards (AOB). 
To the contrary, there is an inverse relationship between ownership concentration (OWN) and 
compliance level. 
These findings provide incremental contributions and depart from prior literature in threefold. 
First, the study has incorporated the aspect of harmonization over time, which is lacking in 
prior studies. Thus, the study used panel data instead of single year data. Arguably, compliance 
disclosure increases over time (Hassan et al., 2006, Peng, 2008). Hence the 3-year period 
analyses provide an original contribution on how developing countries are growing with IFRS, 
which has been a continuous question from policymakers (IASB, IFAC, & PAFA) as well as 
academicians (Ball, 2016; Nobes, 2011, 2013). It also overcomes the limitation noted by 
Tsalavoutas (2011)1  by providing evidence of IFRS compliance beyond the first year of 
adoption. Second, contrary to prior studies, that used capital market-based theories such as 
agency theory and positive accounting theory, we employed stakeholder salience theory to 
complement and extend literature. We argue that stakeholders’ characteristic is more prevalent 
                                                          
1 It focuses on the first year of mandatory implementation of IFRS. 
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in Africa than capital market-based theories. This is because the capital market is not central 
to the development of most of the African countries. More important, there are fewer 
participants in the markets compared to samples in prior studies. Third, we provide a 
comparison of compliance among African countries simultaneously. We also showcase the 
impact of years of IFRS experience over compliance. Prior studies have not considered these 
pertinent issues. 
For companies, our studies provide empirical evidence on the importance of having chartered 
accountants’ corporate boards as well as competent audit committees involved in ensuring high 
compliance with IFRS. Our findings also provide valuable information for professional 
accounting organizations on the role of its members (chartered accountants) in the effectiveness 
of IFRS compliance. Further, the findings are also useful for IASB and IFAC in encouraging 
IFRS compliance because it provides evidence of what needs to be done to achieve high 
compliance. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.0 presents the review of the 
literature and Section 3.0 explores relevant theory and hypotheses. Section 4.0 describes the 
research methods and regression model that was used to test the hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents 
results and discussion on the findings. The paper concludes with implications and limitation of 
the study in Chapter 6. 
2.0. Literature review. 
IFRS has attracted numerous studies but dominated by consequences on the capital market 
(Barth et al. 2008; Hope et al. 2006, Liu et al. 2011). Liu et al. (2011) found an increase in 
accounting quality and value relevance of accounting information on the Chinese capital 
market. On comparability, Liu, (2011) highlighted that net income under IFRS is not 
completely comparable to US-GAAP due to difference in tangible assets revaluation and 
business acquisition recognition and presentation. However, these studies have found in 
common that the benefit of IFRS can only be achieved if there is high compliance. In a survey 
of literature, Houque et al. (2017) found that the benefits of IFRS in reducing information 
asymmetry and improving quality and transparency only manifest with good drivers of 
compliance and enforcement. Similarly, Hope (2003) showcased that firm-level disclosures are 
positively associated with accurate analyst forecasts. However, the relationship is much 
stronger if there is enforcement and a good environment for compliance. Dayanandan et al. 
(2015) also highlighted the relationship between disclosure determinants and benefits of IFRS. 
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In their studies, they found that common law countries with strong investor protection laws 
have high disclosures and that this relationship reduces income smoothing and earnings 
management. 
Through a synthesis of theories and review of the literature on developing countries, Samaha 
and Khlif (2016) concluded that there are mixed results on firm characteristics and degree of 
IFRS compliance. The authors also indicated the scarcity of research in developing countries 
because few studies had explicitly looked at developing countries only. 
In China, Chen and Rezaee (2012) provided empirical findings on the role of internal corporate 
governance in achieving high compliance with IFRS and its associated benefits of quality 
reporting. They found that Chinese-listed companies with effective boards of directors are more 
likely to comply with converged IFRS. 
Using 411 compliance index items, Karim and Ahmed (2005) found a significant positive 
relationship between firm-level compliance and the Big4 auditing firms and an inverse 
relationship with corporate size among 188 companies in Bangladesh. However, in a cross-
country analysis by Al-Shammari et al. (2008) among Gulf Co-operation Council members, it 
was revealed that large companies are more likely to comply with IFRS but no significant 
association was found between ownership dispersion and compliance with IFRS.  
With the aid of 101 items from 12 IFRSs, Al-Mutawaa and Hewiady (2010) provided evidence 
on the significant positive influence of corporate size and audit type on compliance level among 
121 companies in Kuwait. Similarly, Alsaeed (2006) highlighted that disclosure level is 
positively and significantly associated with firm size. However, there was low disclosure in 
Saudi Arabia. 
With a comprehensive questionnaire survey, Uyar, Kilic, and Gokcen, (2016) revealed that 
there are variations in IFRS compliance among Turkish companies with the individual IFRS. 
Whereas almost all companies fully comply with inventories and cash flow statements (IAS 2 
and IAS 7), compliance with IFRS 2; share-based payment and IFRS 4 insurance contracts are 
very low. They attributed these to the complexities of business operations in the country. 
However, the case might be that these two standards are not relevant to most of the companies. 
Their studies also documented that foreign ownership, firm size, listing status, and staff training 
as the significant determinants of IFRS compliance in Turkey.  
A prior study by Demir and Bahadi (2014) on a sample of 168 companies showed that the 
compliance level in Turkey is about 79% which is influenced by the Big4 auditors and inversely 
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related to the leverage of the companies. They did not identify any statistically significant 
relationship between company size and age with IFRS compliance. 
In a related study by Misurlioghlu, Tucker, and Yukselturk (2013), it was found that 
compliance to measurement requirements per IFRS was low in Turkey, due to lack of skills, 
resources, and irrelevancy of some standards to individual companies. The authors indicated 
that standards that involve subjective judgments such as fair valuation, impairment, and 
financial instruments were problematic to most companies. Concerning the influencing factors 
of compliance, their study concluded that auditor size/prominence and leverage have a 
significant positive impact on measurement compliance, whereas compliance with disclosure 
is determined by auditor size/prominence, firm size, and foreign ownership. 
With a specific focus on the impact of privatization on voluntary disclosures, Al-Akra et al. 
(2010) found a significant increase in disclosure level after privatization in Jordan. Foreign 
investment, as well as company size, were also found to impact disclosures in Jordan. 
In another study, Ahmed and Ali (2015) examined compliance with IFRS disclosure 
requirements of listed companies within the three major countries in South Asia, namely India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh and evaluated the corporate attributes which influence the degree of 
compliance with these standards. The authors used a self-constructed scoring system to develop 
a total compliance index for each sample company. They reported significant variations in total 
compliance levels across companies and different national accounting standards. Their results 
also support the expectation that compliance levels are positively related to company size, 
profitability, and multinational company status.  
Using different disclosure scores approach on intangible assets for Italian companies, Devalle, 
Rizzato and Busso, (2016), revealed that there is low compliance with mandatory disclosures 
on intangible assets among Italian companies. However, the degree of compliance differs 
among the scoring approaches and the weights impact on the independent variables that 
influence the level of compliance. Thus, each scoring approach yields a different determinant 
on IFRS compliance. Therefore, they argue that the findings of prior studies may be affected 
by a methodology which future research should control. Notwithstanding the conflicting results 
due to a different approach, the study documented that, the weight of interests on revenues have 
a significant positive impact on mandatory disclosure on intangible which is a distinctive 
feature on the Italian market due to the role of the banking system. 
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In Greece, Tsalavoutas (2011) study on 153 on listed companies shows the difference in 
compliance score between weighted and unweighted score approaches. The study also 
highlighted the low compliance among the sample companies. Regarding the determinants, 
Tsalavoutas (2011) found that the Big4 clients and companies with positive changes in IFRS 
2004 restated profit comply most with IFRS mandatory disclose in 2005. 
Santos et al. (2014), recorded that Brazilian companies comply with only 16.04% to 33.72% 
(for both partial and dichotomous unweighted scores) of IFRS requirements with the company 
size and the Big4 been the significant determinants of high compliance. The authors explain 
that the low level of compliance is due to cultural-institutional traditions, learning curve during 
the adoption of IFRS and weak enforcement. However, their findings and conclusion are 
expected as the study consider only first-year adoption which is characterized by such low 
compliance.  
Using South African dataset, Sellamin and Fendri (2017), found that the independence of AC 
(measured as the number of independent directors on the committee) have a significant positive 
influence on company’s compliance with related party disclosures. Similarly, the accounting 
and finance expertise of audit committee members are also associated positively with high 
disclosure on related party transactions. However, the size and number of meetings of the audit 
committee do not affect compliance with related party disclosures. Their study reported 
average compliance of 77% with seven companies obtaining full compliance. 
With the aid of a weighted compliance score, Appiah et al. (2016) investigated the level of 
compliance by Ghanaian listed companies. Their study which covered 27 IFRS found that 
larger companies are likely to have high compliance due to listing requirements and avoidance 
of policy sanctions (see also Street & Bryant, 2000). Based on their findings of the positive 
relationship between the level of compliance and auditor type, Appiah et al. (2016) argue that 
listed firms use experts like the Big4 to avoid reputational risk. On company age, their study 
reported an inverse relationship with compliance with the reason that younger firms are more 
likely to comply with IFRS due to their higher investment needs than old firms which can 
generate internal funds or have established reputations.  
While Samaha and Stapleton (2009) findings in Egypt were consistent with Karim and Ahmed 
(2005), in respect to the significant positive relationship between international auditors and 
IFRS compliance, their findings on ownership dispersion was positive and significant which 
contradicts Al-Shammari et al. (2008). Contrarily to Karim and Ahmed (2005), Al-Akra et al. 
(2010), documented that firm size, leverage and auditor size have a significant effect on IFRS 
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compliance but consistent with Al-Shammari et al. (2008), they did not find any significant 
relationship between ownership dispersion and compliance level. Using Kenya as a case study, 
Bova and Perera (2012), provided empirical evidence that supports a significant positive 
relationship between IFRS compliance and corporate size as well as auditor type. Also, they 
found that foreign ownership is positively associated with IFRS compliance. 
It is evident from the above literature review that scholars have ignored the influence of 
stakeholder attributes on compliance with IFRS. Hence this study attempts to fill in this gap by 
providing original findings on the relationship between stakeholders’ attributes and IFRS 
compliance in Africa. 
3.0. Theory and hypotheses development. 
This study employs the stakeholder salience theory proposed by Mitchell et al. (1997) to 
investigate the determinants of IFRS harmonization at the firm level. According to this theory, 
although the organization is environmentally dependent on different groups and individuals, 
the managers decide the salient stakeholder and the level of attention it deserves at any point 
in time. However, managers’ decisions on salience stakeholders depend on the amount of 
power, legitimacy, and urgency that the stakeholder possesses. Managers’ actions vary 
depending on the stakeholders involved. Moreover, such variations moderate the effects of 
management characteristics (Frederick, 1995). Thus, the ability of a stakeholder to influence 
compliance with the accounting practice depends on how managers perceive such stakeholders 
in regard to the power, legitimacy and urgency the stakeholders possess associated with 
financial reporting issues of the company, as well as the urgency exhibited by the stakeholders.  
Unlike the positive accounting theory (Watts & Zimmerman 1986, 1990) that predicts and 
explains firm behavior based on external factors such as size, financing structure, firm 
reputation, and capital needs, stakeholder salience theory specifically examines the behavior 
of managers who are the center of firms’ operations regarding its competing stakeholder. 
Management is more likely to comply with IFRS if the stakeholders involved have sufficiently 
strong attributes to influence managers. Mitchell et al. (1997) argued that managers’ responses 
to the demands of a stakeholder depend on the interplay of power, legitimacy, and urgency of 
the stakeholder. Consequently, the interaction among these attributes results in different classes 
of stakeholders: dormant, discretionary, demanding, dominant, dangerous, dependent, and 
definitive. Arguably, not all classes of stakeholders may have the same level of interest in the 
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compliance with IFRS by the company. Therefore, this study has identified three classes of 
stakeholders who can influence managers in complying with IFRS. 
3.1. Definitive stakeholder. 
According to Mitchell et al. (1997), definitive stakeholders have power backed by law, and 
their claims are urgent. These claims become the top priority for managers because there is a 
clear and immediate mandate for managers to work on their issues (Mitchell et al. 1997). A 
stakeholder has power if they persuade management to do something that management may 
not willingly do (Pfeffer 1981; Dahl, 1957; Weber 1947). Power can stem from owning greater 
knowledge than the other party, through using force, or by position with legal backing. Unlike 
other board members or committees, competent audit committee power to influence 
management accounting practices does not only flow from their position as board members but 
from their professional knowledge of financial reporting systems as well. 
Further, the audit committee has the legitimacy to check that management are adopting the best 
reporting practices. Suchman (1995), defined legitimacy as the assumption that the actions of 
a firm are appropriate (see Weber, 1947). The primary objective of the audit committee is to 
ensure management adopt the best practices for the true and fair presentation of the company’s 
activities. As such, a competent audit committee will always demand that management comply 
with global accounting standards, such as IFRS.  
Not only does the audit committee have power and legitimacy regarding harmonization of 
IFRS, but their claims are also considered as urgent because they ensure the right accounting 
practices. Mitchell et al. (1997) defined urgency as the degree to which stakeholders’ claim 
requires immediate attention from management. Internationally recognized corporate 
governance codes or reports, such as the Cadbury Report 1992 and the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(Sections 301 and 407) among others have indicated that the audit committee is a vital 
mechanism for safeguarding the integrity of financial reporting in a company. Hence, the 
existence of a competent audit committee is a matter of urgency for management in regard to 
best reporting practices. More specifically, the corporate governance principle(s) advocates 
that the audit committee is an efficient mechanism for monitoring financial reporting issues, 
such as compliance with IFRS. There is a common assertion in the literature that the audit 
committee benefits the company and general public in part by ensuring quality reporting 
(Bryce, Ali & Mather, 2014; Rupley, Almer & Philibrik, 2011; Sellami & Fendri, 2017). Bryce 
et al. (2014) found that the audit committee is more effective in ensuring quality reporting after 
IFRS adoption than in pre-IFRS periods. Similarly, Sellami and Fendri’s (2017) results confirm 
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that competent audit committees ensure compliance among South African companies. On this 
basis, it is hypothesized that: 
H1: There is a positive association between audit committee competence and the level of 
IFRS compliance. 
 3.2. Dominant stakeholders. 
According to the stakeholder salience theory, a dominant stakeholder has both the power and 
legitimacy to influence the firm’s activities, but no urgency to receive immediate actions from 
management. Cyert and March (1963) stated that such stakeholders form the dominant 
collation in the enterprise. All directors have a similar level of legal power for influencing 
management to comply with IFRS. However, professional accountants on board hold extra 
power flowing from their professional knowledge in accounting. Also, they are bound by their 
professional ethics to ensure that companies engage in sound financial reporting practices. 
Hence, professional accountants have more power and legitimacy to influence management 
around compliance with IFRS. 
Contrary to the audit committee, not all professional accountants on corporate boards will be 
directly involved in the monitoring of financial reporting practices. Hence, their claim may not 
be urgent to demand an immediate response from managers. However, management is 
concerned about their expectations due to their power and legitimacy (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Badolato, Donelson, and Ege (2014) argued that accounting experts on boards minimize 
accounting irregularities and abnormal accruals. Likewise, Abernathy et al. (2014) documented 
that public accountants on corporate boards ensure timely accounting information as compared 
to another type of financial expert on a board. Additionally, they found that the association is 
much stronger if an accountant chairs the committee. 
Although accountants on corporate boards are dominant stakeholders in the financial reporting 
of management, and expect to receive much attention from managers, their influence depends 
on board numbers. Furthermore, it is assumed that the independence of directors strengthens 
their position on the board and influences company management. Because non-executive 
directors are not expected to receive any direct benefit (except allowances) from the company, 
they will act in a professional and unbiased manner.  Thus, it can be posited that:  
H2: There is a positive association between the number of accountants on corporate boards 
and IFRS compliance. 
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3.3. Discretionary stakeholders. 
Mitchell et al. (1997) suggested that discretionary stakeholders are those who hold legitimacy 
but no power to influence or urgency to demand claims from management. Shareholders, and 
especially minority interests, may have the legitimacy to demand companies to harmonize with 
best accounting practices such as IFRS, yet they do not have the power or urgency to request 
such claims. That is, in the absence of power and urgency, there is less pressure on managers 
in responding to the demand by shareholders to comply with accounting standards. However, 
because shareholding is concentrated around a few persons, shareholders will gain power from 
their ownership to force their legitimacy on management to comply with IFRS. 
Shareholders with large holdings have both power and legitimacy as well as the urgency to 
demand management comply with IFRS. As stated by Mitchell et al. (1997), this class of 
stakeholder is not static, and may change as the company ownership structure changes hands. 
Arguably, concentrated shareholdings have high legitimacy and power to influence 
management on the type of accounting practices the company should implement. Therefore, it 
is hypothesized that: 
H3: There is a positive association between concentrated ownership and IFRS 
compliance.   
4.0. Research methods 
4.1. Population and sampling. 
As at the time of collecting the data, 18 African countries mandatorily required the use of IFRS 
(IFRS Foundation 2017). Of these countries, only 13 operated active stock exchanges (African 
Markets, 2018). Hence the sample is limited to companies listed on these 13 stock exchanges. 
Consistent with prior studies (Al-Shammari et al. 2008, Mazzi, et al. 2017, Sellami & Fendri, 
2017) this study covers 3-year accounting periods (2014–2016). This enables us to avoid the 
noise of first-time adoption problems (Abdullah et al. 2015) of the countries that recently 
adopted IFRS. (e.g., Nigeria adopted IFRS in 2012 and has one of the biggest stock exchanges 
in Africa). Also, the period 2014–2016 was chosen because is consistent with Sellami and 
Fendri’s (2017) argument for using the recent financial statement to construct a compliance 
score. More important, the 3-year period is good for limiting cofounding effects due to time-
varying variables such as macro-economic factors and frequent revision of IFRS, which cannot 
be controlled for in the model (see also Chen and Rezaee 2012). A sample size of each country 
is not proportionate because of inadequate data and differences in size of stock exchanges. 
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However, the sample is a fair representation of all countries and key industries. The final 
sample consist of 205 non-financial listed companies in IFRS-adopting African countries. 
Table 1 summarises the step-by-step sample derivation. Because there is no database on 
compliance scores and other variables of interest, data were hand collected from the annual 
reports of the sample companies. 
Insert Table 1.0: Sample selection 
4.2. Compliance score 
Two main approaches have emerged from existing literature on how the degree of 
harmonization is measured. Studies such as Guerreiro, Rodrigues and Craig, (2008); 
Jermakowicz and Gornik-Tomaszewski, 2006; Jones and Higgins, 2006; Joshi and Ramadhan, 
(2002); Larson and Street, (2004); Navarro-Garcia & Bastida, (2010); Rezaee, Smith and 
Szendi (2010); Uyara et al. (2016) used questionnaire surveys to record companies’ degree of 
compliance with IFRS. Despite having the advantage of providing first-hand information, it 
limits the accuracy and reliability of any further analysis. The majority of the surveys used 
narrow coding of binary Yes or No to check if a company has implemented a standard. Such 
coding does not capture variations, such as companies that partially or fully comply. Moreover, 
respondents (managers) are more likely to give artificial answers to portray a positive image of 
their company. 
The second approach to harmonization measurement is the construction of compliance scores 
based on the information provided in the annual financial statements of the companies (Appiah, 
et al. 2016; Bova & Perera, 2012; Devalle et al. 2016; Santos et al. 2014; Elsayed & Hoque, 
2010). Although this approach involves subjective scoring, it captures vast amounts of 
information and is reliable. Due to its verifiability and ability to be repeated, it is widely used 
in literature. Therefore, this study also follows literature and constructs a compliance score 
based on information from annual financial statements.  
The most challenging factor in analyzing compliance levels among companies is 
determining which of the IFRS standard applies to a particular industry. For example, while 
intangible assets are relevant to the IT industry, it may not be relevant or common among the 
merchandise industry. Consequently, a generalization of compliance across all companies may 
lead to a bias of high scores towards some industries. For instance, the manufacturing sector 
has been noted to have high compliance scores (Cooke 1992; Raffournier 1995), because most 
of the standards apply to manufacturing companies as compared to new industries, such as IT 
and real estate. To overcome this challenge, some scholars (Devalle, et al. 2016; Santos et al. 
 13 
 
2014) have employed the relevant compliance approach through stepwise analysis. First, an 
examination is carried out to establish the applicable standard to each industry before 
compliance is calculated. Thus, compliance is measured based on the standards applicable to 
companies. Following from literature, this study used the stepwise approach to examine 
compliance on a company basis, with a focus on standards relevant to each company. We admit 
that determining which standard is applicable to a company involves subjectivity. Hence, we 
use the KPMG checklist as a guide in selecting applicable standards. Based on the 
characteristics of each company, the checklist suggests applicable standards.  
Another challenge of calculating harmonization score is determining whether to score 
standards or individual requirements per standards. To address this, two approaches have 
evolved in literature: the unweighted index (Cooke index) and weighted score (partial score).  
Tsalavoutas (2011) argued that scores from Cooke’s method might cause a misleading 
conclusion because of its sensitivity to different items in each standard. Because both 
approaches complement each other, this study adopts both approaches. 
Unweighted compliance score (UCS): Under this approach, each item is assigned the same 
code (weight) irrespective of the standards. Thus, attention is given to the items, not the 
standards. The coding would involve 1 if a company disclosed the applicable item or 0 if it did 
not. While this approach is simple and understandable, is limited by giving the same weight to 
all standards irrespective of the number of disclosure requirements per standards. For example, 
IAS 1 (Financial statements presentation) that involve more requirements is weighted in the 
same way as the IAS 2 Inventory that is composed of fewer requirements. 
Formula  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠
  
Weighted compliance score (WCS): To give relevance to a number of requirements per 
standard, WCS was developed (Abdullah et al. 2015; Street & Gray 2002; Tsalavoutas et al. 
2011,). With this approach, compliance with each standard is examined before an overall 
compliance score is calculated. That is, the actual items disclosed per standards are matched 
with the applicable items per standard. Then, the average of the harmonization scores of all the 
standards is calculated to represent the compliance level of the company. That is, WCS 
involves a two-stage analysis: 
Step 1; 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑? 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑
 
 14 
 
Step 2   
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠
   
Mathematically the compliance score is calculated using this formula:  
𝑊𝐶𝑆𝑎 =
𝐷
𝑀
=
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖=1
∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑚𝑖=1
 
Where WCSa is the total compliance score for each company, 0≤Za≤1. D is the total number of 
items disclosed by the company a, and M is the maximum number of applicable required 
disclosures for company a. (this approach is consistent with Glaum et al. 2013; Hoogdoorn et 
al. 2008; Mazzi et al. 2017, Tsalavoutas 2011). In addition to recognizing the number of 
requirements per standards, WCS also has the advantage of providing information for the 
standard-by-standard analysis. 
Calculation of compliance score: Following from the description of the compliance score, we 
developed a disclosure checklist using both the unweighted and weighted score.  To achieve a 
comprehensive checklist, we rely on a checklist of the Big4 accounting firms as a guide2. 
However, our final checklist is based on the requirements of each standard as issued by IASB. 
As market-oriented standards, there have been numerous amendments and revision in IFRS. 
Hence this study accounted for these amendments by incorporating relevant disclosure 
requirements according to years of revision. To cater for the different reporting period of 
companies and countries, the appropriate checklist was used depending on the year that the 
majority of the period falls in. For example, a company whose accounting period ends on 31st 
March will be assessed with 2014, 2015, and 2016 accounting years, but a company with an 
accounting year ending in September will be assessed on 2015-, 2016-, and 2017-applicable 
disclosures. These are minor cases because many of the sample companies’ accounting years 
end in December. As established in prior studies, some disclosures3 were removed because it 
was not possible to assess them from the published financial statements only (Mazzi et al. 2017, 
Sellami & Fendri 2017). 
An initial assessment of the different annual reports show that some companies presented IFRS 
disclosures in sections of the annual report other than the financial statements and footnotes 
                                                          
2 Consistent with Al-Sharmmari et al. (2008) who validated their checklist using Ernst and Young; KPMG 
checklist. 
3 Examples IAS 34-Interim financial reporting; IAS 20 (36) (31), etc. 
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section; hence, we took extra care to read relevant parts of the annual reports4 to avoid 
penalizing companies for non-compliance. Although this approach yields comprehensive 
lookout for all disclosures, is likely to result in an upward bias of compliance index and 
negatively affect the significance levels in the estimation of the determinants of compliance 
(Glaum et al. 2013). 
In accordance with the literature (Abdullah et al. 2015; Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Cooke, 
1992; Mazzi et al. 2017; Sellami & Fendri, 2017), the validity of the research instrument was 
established as follows. First, the author developed a checklist based on the text of each standard 
as issued by IASB. This checklist was compared with that of the Big4 accounting firms. After 
comparison, a revised checklist which aligns with the Big4 was drafted and sent to independent 
accounting practitioner. The final checklist is presented in Table 2.0 
As used in other studies (Abdullah et al. 2015; Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Cooke, 1992; 
Glum et al 2013; Mazzi et al. 2017; Sellami & Fendri, 2017; Steet & Gray 2002 Tsalvounts 
2011), a score of 1 means the company complies with the applicable required item, and 0 means 
the company fails to comply with the applicable required item. NA means that the item is 
required but not applicable to the company5. As argued by Cooke (1992), this method has the 
advantage of not penalizing companies for not disclosing non-applicable requirements. 
However, due to its dichotomous nature, it does not give room for partial disclose of the item6.  
All the 3 years’ financial statements of each company were reviewed and scored independently 
of each other. 
Insert Table 2.0 Checklist for calculating compliance score. 
 
4.3. Model Specification. 
The model involves multivariate Ordinary Least Square regression with three main 
independent variables of interest, (ACC, AOB OWS), and six control variables (EXP, OWT, 
BOD, NED, TAA, Big4). For convenience, time and firm subscription are removed. 
UCS/WCS = α0+β1ACC+ β2 AOB + β3OWS + β4EXP + β5OWT + β6BOD+β7 NED +  
                                                          
4 Some companies in South Africa disclose related parties such as key management compensation in Directors 
report. 
5 For example, IAS 16:77(b) requires companies to disclose the effective date of revaluation, however this is 
not applicable to companies which use cost model valuation of PPE. 
6 For example IAS 12:87(b) requires the disclosure of important features of income tax systems and factors 
that affect the amount of the potential tax consequences on dividend. Is very difficult to determine if the 
company has fully disclose all relevant features. 
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β8 TAA + β9Big4 +  Ɛ𝒕……………………………………………………………………EQ 3 
Where: UCS/WCS – Compliance score 
   ACC   - Audit Committee Competence 
   AOB   - Accountants on Board 
OWS – Ownership structure 
EXP – IFRS Experience. 
OWT – Type of Ownership. 
BOD – Board size. 
NED – Board Independence. 
TAA – Firm size. 
Big4 – Type of Auditor. 
See table 9.0 variable description source and expected signs. 
5.0. Results and discussions. 
5.1. Descriptive statistics. 
Table 3.0 presents the median score for the full sample and companies from the top 4 countries 
over the sample period. The average weighted (unweighted score) compliance score among the 
companies over the period is 70.94% (73.09%), which is relatively high, with a minimum score 
of 58.59% (62.86%) and maximum of 83.55% (85.61%). Contrary to prior studies, such as 
Glaum et al. (2013), Mazzi et al. (2017), and Sellami and Fendri (2017), but consistent with 
Al-Shammari et al. (2008), we did not find a fully compliant company over the sample period. 
The year-on-year mean score indicates that compliance with IFRS has been improving in 
Africa, probably because of the continuous application of the standards. That is, countries are 
growing well with IFRS. Al-Shammari et al. (2008) suggested that an overall increase in 
compliance signals a gradual progression towards de facto harmonization. 
Notwithstanding the increase in compliance level over the period, the standard deviation of 
6.99% (6.23%) shows differences that exist among the companies. Arguably, mandatory 
disclosure is not sticky over time because compliance with the standards is usually at the 
discretion of managers and their risks of non-compliance. Hence, there are variations in the 
level of disclosures across the standards.  
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Over the years, IAS 18 (Revenue) recorded the highest compliance level of 100%, probably 
because of the few requirements7, and this level is common for all companies. Other high 
scoring standards were IAS 33, IAS 10, IAS 7, IAS 20, and IAS 23. The lowest scoring 
standards included IAS 37, IFRS 13, IAS 17, and IAS 19. The high-scoring standards mostly 
have fewer disclosure requirements and are fundamental to all entities. It should be noted that 
“IFRS”-titled standards (e.g., IFRS 2 and IFRS 4) had less compliance compared with “IAS”-
titled standards. Moreover, there is low compliance and high standard deviation of standards8 
involving high proprietary cost. 
We found that most companies provided limited disclosures on fair values using a common 
phrase “the carrying values of assets and liabilities approximate their fair values.” Another 
problematic standard is employee benefits (IAS 19). Except for companies in Mauritius that 
provided high disclosure on IAS 19, most companies failed to disclose extensive requirements 
on employee benefits, especially if they are using defined contributions. Companies also 
disclosed going concern status only when they made losses.  
Consistent with Sellami and Fendri (2017), we found low compliance with IAS 24 “relative 
parties’ disclosures.”. Some of the missing disclosures were post-employment benefits and 
termination benefits of key management. More than 85% of the sample did not provide any 
disclose on the provision of doubtful debts related to the outstanding balance of related parties. 
Also, approximately 55% of the sample companies failed to disclose whether those related 
transactions were carried out on arms-length transactions or otherwise.  
A minor non-disclosure across all sample companies was the reasons for a business 
combination. According to IFRS 3: B64(d) (Business combination), companies are required to 
disclose the reason for acquiring a subsidiary. However, our results show that about 80% did 
not disclose this relevant information. 
There was also variation in the level of compliance to specific standards in each country. 
Whereas companies in Mauritius had high compliance with IAS 19, they were low in IAS 17. 
Similarly, South African companies had a high score in IAS 17 and a low score in IFRS 13. 
Nigeria, on the other hand, provided detailed disclosure on IAS 8 and less disclosure on IAS 
                                                          
7 According to the checklist IAS 18 had only 2 applicable requirements which are externally observable. 
8 IAS 17, IAS 19 IAS 24 IAS 36 IAS 37 IFRS 13 IFRS 10 
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19. This trend implies that there are possible country-specific factors for compliance with 
IFRS9 
For IAS 36, impairment of assets also received a low score. Similar to the findings of Glaum 
et al. (2013), we found that most companies did not report items such as a method for testing 
for impairment of goodwill, discount rates, and long-term growth rates (see also Mazzi et al. 
2017). About 55% of the sample—for which section 134d10 of IAS 36 is/was applicable—did 
not disclose the key assumption for determining recoverable amount. Some companies (25%) 
failed to comply with the requirement of 12911 of IAS 36 of disclosing impairment losses across 
the reportable segment. 
In Table 3.0 we also present the median values of compliance scores for the top four countries 
by sample size. Under both WCS and UCS scores, all of the countries improved in compliance 
over the three years. It is evident that Mauritius had the highest score over the years, followed 
by South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria. This difference among the countries is reflective of how 
earlier adopters12 of IFRS have advanced in compliance further than late adopters. The 
compliance score among these four-sample countries is also similar to all the countries’ scores, 
which signals consistency in the scoring. 
Insert Table 3.0. Median compliance score by countries.  
Insert Table 4.0. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Table 4.0 summarises the descriptive statistics of the independent and control variables. It also 
includes variables that form part of the composite index13. Despite the recommendation by 
several corporate governance reports and codes such as the Cadbury Report 1992, Sarbanes 
                                                          
9 These factors are outside scope of this current study. 
10IAS 36 134d(i) If recoverable amount is based on value in use: 
i) each key assumption on which management has based its cash flow projections for the period 
covered by the most recent budgets/forecasts; 
IAS 36 134e(i) Disclose the valuation techniques used to measure fair values 
i) Each key assumption on which management has based its determination of fair value less costs of 
disposal. 
11 An entity that reports segment information in accordance with IFRS 8 Operating Segments shall disclose the 
following for each reportable segment: 
a)     the amount of impairment losses recognised in profit or loss and in other comprehensive income during 
the period; and  
b)     The amount of reversals of impairment losses recognised in profit or loss and in other comprehensive 
income during the period. 
12 Mauritius and South Africa adopted IFRS in 2001 and 2005 respectively making them earlier adopters while 
Nigeria adopted in 2012. 
13 It includes number of accountants on audit committee, size of audit committee and independent directors 
on audit committee which are were used to construct audit committee competence. 
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Oxley Act 2002, and Kings Report III, some companies are yet to establish an audit 
committee14. For those who have formed audit committees, the membership ranged between 2 
and 7. Similarly, the number of non-executive directors (NED) on the board ranged from 1 to 
14 with a mean of 7 (median 7). The minimum board size of the sample companies was 4 and 
a maximum of 17, with a mean and median of 9 members. 
On average, there are two (2) chartered accountants (CAs) on a company board, of which at 
least one serves on the audit committee. Some companies do not have a CA on its board or 
audit committee. For the majority of corporate boards, 75% of their members are non-executive 
directors, which is consistent with most governance reports (Cadbury Report 1992, Sarbanes 
Oxley Act 2002, Kings Report III). Similarly, about 88% of audit committee members are non-
executive. Regarding the audit committee competence (ACC), which is a composite of the 
number of accountants on the audit committee, the number of non-executive directors, and the 
size of the audit committee, we found that ACC among the sample companies averaged 72.53% 
(median 75%) with a maximum of 95%. This result implies that most companies’ audit 
committees have 72.53% competencies to discharge their duties. The standard deviation of 
22.5% indicates variation across companies and countries. Companies in South Africa recorded 
the highest ACC due to the high level of corporate governance regulations. Mauritius followed 
because of the dominance of Western practices. Countries such as Malawi, Uganda, and 
Zambia have low ACC. The low score on ACC is driven by the low number of accountants on 
audit committees. As a cross-country study, we did not benchmark these results with any 
specific corporate governance code or act as in the Sellami and Fendri (2017) study on South 
Africa, because each country complies with different legislation. 
Ownership percentage of the sample size ranges from 15.0% to 90% with a mean (median) of 
44.48% (42.91%). A high percentage indicates high ownership concentration while a low 
percentage indicates spread of ownership. On average, almost 50% shares of sample companies 
are in the hands of a single investor (institution or person), mostly founders and promoters. 
                                                          
14 It must be noted that in Nigeria, according to section 359 of the Company and Alied Matters Act, companies 
are required to have an audit committee making up of six (6) members, made up of three (3) shareholders 
representative and three (3) directors. This audit committee are primary responsible to the shareholders as it 
Chairman is shareholder representative and may have different objective from the audit committee of the 
board. Hence companies do have additional committee for the board while others keep the mandatory audit 
committee for both purposes. In other companies, the 3 directors on the mandatory audit committee forms 
the audit committee of the board. Hence in constructing ACC we only focus on the either the directors on the 
mandatory board or audit committee of the board if any. 
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Related to the percentage of ownership is the type of ownership, which measures whether the 
top shareholder is foreign15 or local nationals. Of 224 sample companies, 90, representing 40%, 
have their majority shareholders as foreign-based persons or institutions. This show that the 
sample is well balanced by capturing both locally owned and foreign-owned companies. More 
important, it shows that foreign investors will have an interest in the compliance of IFRS in 
Africa. Regarding the type of auditors, 85% of the total sample companies were audited by the 
Big4 and this percentage is almost the same across the study period. 
As a pre-regression estimation procedure, we established the Pearson correlation matrix and 
calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) to identify potential multi-collinearity issues. In 
Table 5.0 we present the Person pairwise correlation coefficient for all variables of interest. 
We include both methods of compliance score to check whether both scores capture similar 
information. Mazzi et al. (2017) argued that two scores capture similar information if both 
models are significantly positively correlated. From our results, both the WCS and UCS are 
positively related at the significant level of p<0.001. Both scores are also positively correlated 
with independents (OWS, ACC, and AOB). These preliminary results are consistent with the 
hypotheses. As depicted in Table 5.0, the correlation coefficient of all variables is below 0.6 
(above which there are multi-collinearity issues) except for the correlation between WCS and 
UCS, which is acceptable. Similarly, the untabulated VIF results indicated a maximum factor 
of 6.0, which is below the limit for potential multi-collinearity problems (Neter et al. 1996; 
Gujariti 2003). Since both results are within the required range, we conclude that there is no 
significant multi-collinearity problem among the variables. 
Insert Table 5.0 Correlation matrix on compliance. 
5.2. Regression results. 
Prior literature asserted that using a raw disclosure score as the dependent variable in the 
regression model might be problematic. Al-Shaib (2003) opined that when the raw disclosure 
score is used in the model, the probability score results may be greater than 1 because raw 
compliance score is bounded between 0 and 1 (Cooke 1992). Another problem with using a 
raw score is potential volition of classical regression assumption of normality of the variable. 
After testing for normality of the score, it was found that the raw score is not normally 
distributed. Following prior studies (Abdullah et al. 2015, Glaum et al. 2013, Sellami & Fendri, 
                                                          
15 Foreign shareholders are define as shareholders who from countries other than African country. 
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2017), we transformed the compliance variable to the log of odds ratio to overcome the non-
normality of the dependent variable. Mathematically the log of the odds ratio is computed as 
follows: 
𝑌 = log (
𝑃𝑎
1 − 𝑃𝑎
) 
Where Y is the transformed compliance score and Pa is the percentage score of company. 
We also take the log of BOD, TAA, and NCD to over non-normality of these variables. 
We also converted the compliance scores into percentage form as an alternative to the raw 
score. 
To choose the appropriate model for the panel regression, we performed the Hausman test, 
which indicated that the fixed effect panel regression is appropriate. This is consistent with 
Sellami and Fendri (2017) and Bepari and Molik (2015). 
Table 6.0 presents the results of the model (M) 1 and M2 using the log of compliance score as 
the dependent variable. To minimize the possibility that our results were susceptible to the 
different approaches of constructing the harmonization score, we tested whether the main 
findings were robust against a change in the structure of the compliance score (from UCS to 
WCS). The dependent variable in M1 is UCS and M2 is WCS. We replicated all relevant 
empirical tests. As presented in the M1 column, the results are identical to M2, hence the 
conclusion and implication do not change under the different approach of compliance score. 
The similar R2 across the different approaches indicates that both methods are similar in 
explaining the relationship between the dependent and independent variables (see Glaum et al. 
2013). The F-statistics of 20.46 (21.66) at p<0.001 indicates that the models are well specified. 
Insert Table 6.0 Estimation results on compliance. 
 
Compliance and audit committee competence - ACC (definitive stakeholder) 
Overall, our results demonstrate that ACC has a positive and significant impact on the 
compliance level in Africa. This suggests that the level of ACC is very critical in ensuring 
compliance with IFRS among companies in Africa. Thus, the more competent an audit 
committee is, the more power it owns to demand high compliance with the standard from 
management. As the number of accountants’ increases, the combined power of the audit 
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committee also increases as they use their level of expertise to pressure management for high 
compliance. 
Similarly, the size and independence make the audit committee claim more legitimate and 
urgent for management to respond to it. A high level of independence means they are not likely 
to be influenced by management, and their claims will be seen as genuine and supported by 
shareholders. Therefore, our results confirm the hypothesis (H1) that competence of an audit 
committee representing definite stakeholders has a significant positive relationship with IFRS 
compliance level of companies. This result indicates the importance of having a chartered 
accountant on the audit committee. Chartered accountants provide professional expertise and 
integrity in reporting. Most are former auditors who are well vested in accounting standards.  
Compliance and Accountants on Boards – AOB (Dominant stakeholders). 
Regarding the relationship between dominant stakeholders (AOB) and compliance level, we 
find evidence supporting our hypothesis (H2) that AOBs on boards positively impact the level 
of compliance. Similar to the results on ACC, the higher the number of AOBs, the higher the 
compliance level. Due to their professional qualifications and affiliations, CAs are more likely 
to draw management attention to non-compliance with accounting standards. These members 
were former auditors or senior accountants themselves, hence, they are experienced in the 
preparation and presentation of financial statements (Mangena & Pike 2005). Also, the 
presence of an AOB puts management “on their toes” because some directors will ask questions 
about compliance; therefore, management will want to avoid such queries by complying with 
the standards. In our sample, we find that except for CFOs, other AOBs are non-executive 
directors, which increase their legitimacy on a board.  
Compliance score and ownership (discretionary stakeholder). Consistent with prior 
expectations and literature (Abdullah et al. 2015 and Gluam et al. 2013), we find an inverse 
relationship between concentrated ownership and compliance level. Thus, there is low 
compliance and disclosure in closely held companies. Companies with a high ownership bloc 
by single or a few shareholders are less likely to comply with standards because the majority 
owner (promoter or founder) are usually involved in the day-to-day running of the business. 
Also, they tend to have power over management regarding what needs to be disclosed and not 
disclosed. Due to the proprietary nature of some disclosures, closely held companies prefer 
keeping information within themselves. Non-executive owners who have a high stake can 
easily access company information due to their influence. Our results chime with Abdullah et 
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al. (2015) who found that most institutional settings do not provide an effective mechanism for 
aligning the interest of dominant shareholders and minority shareholders. This is consistent 
with the agency theory that companies with diffuse shareholders will comply with standards to 
avoid multiple litigations from different investors. 
Similarly, according to the salience stakeholder theory, multiple shareholders have the 
legitimacy to place management in checks on compliance with standards to avoid class 
litigation. However, as they increase their shareholding, their power grows. Hence, they tend 
to influence what management should disclose, and in this case they use their power to 
influence less disclosure as they become familiar with internal affairs. We incorporated the 
type of ownership (OWT) to understand whether the nationality of the majority shareholder 
has any impact on the compliance level. Our results showed that there is low compliance among 
companies with foreigners16 as majority shareholders. The reason is that most of the foreign 
investors are from countries such as the US Canada, and France, which are not enthusiastic 
about IFRS. More important, as majority shareholders, they hold key positions, such as CFO 
and CEO, thereby having access to internal information; hence no need for requesting high 
compliance. This result also fits into the resources-seeking FDI theory because most foreign 
investors in Africa are more interested in the resources of the country, not compliance with 
laws or standards. Overall, our results provide evidence for the rejection of hypothesis (H3), 
which states that concentrated ownership is positively associated with compliance level. Our 
results accord with Sellami and Fendri (2017), who found a significant negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and related parties’ disclosure of companies in South Africa. 
Similarly, our findings support the works of Gluam et al. (2013) and Atansovia (2015), who 
highlighted a similar relationship on IFRS 3 and IFRS 7 respectively. 
Regarding the control variables such as board size (BOD) and board independence (NED), we 
found a significant relationship between board size and compliance level. Consistent with 
agency theory, Sellami and Fehnri (2017) and Xie et al. (2003), our results demonstrate the 
importance of board independence on the level of compliance. We followed the arguments of 
Faverse-Marchesi (2000) and Mangena and Pike (2005) in explaining the positive relationship 
between non-executive directors (NED)17 and compliance level. NED ensures the appointment 
of quality independent external auditors, which leads to high-quality assurance services. More 
important, NED is responsive to external shareholders, hence it will ensure high compliance 
                                                          
16 Foreigners are defined as investors or shareholders (persons or institutions) outside Africa. 
17 To avoid complication independent directors are directors who does not hold executive positions. 
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(see Abdullah et al., 2015). This relationship is consistent with the results of other variables, 
such as non-executive directors on the audit committee and AOB. The higher the number of 
NEDs on board, the larger the audit committee size and the higher the chance of getting more 
CAs on boards and audit committees. 
Similar to Sellami and Fehnri (2017) in South Africa, Abdullah et al. (2015) in Malaysia, 
Tsalavoutas et al. (2011) in Greece, we document a non-significant association between 
leverage (LEV) and compliance score. Also consistent with Sellami and Fendri (2017) in South 
Africa and Utaman and Utaman (2014) in Indonesia, our results show that the type of auditor 
does not impact on compliance level. We found an insignificant relationship between auditor 
type and compliance level because about 90% of sample companies were audited by the Big4. 
5.3. Robustness and sensitivity analysis. 
We conducted additional analysis using the percentage form of the dependent variable as well 
as NCA, BOD, and NED. We replicate all relevant empirical tests. As presented in Table 7.0 
under M3 and M4, the results are identical to M1 and M2; hence, the conclusions and 
implications do not change under the different approach of compliance score. 
Insert Table 7.0 Additional analysis using percentage format of the independent variable. 
 
Sensitivity analysis. One of the limitations of cross countries studies is an unequal 
representation of countries in the sample size. Hence, is likely to be influenced by countries 
with the highest number in the sample size. Since this is the case for our study, we re-performed 
all the empirical tests on the major counties individually (the top 3 countries; Mauritius, 
Nigeria, and South Africa). The results are presented in Table 8.0 under M5-M7. While there 
is no significant change in results across the countries and base model, we find that the 
coefficient is much higher in the case of South Africa, followed by Mauritius and Nigeria. We 
also find that company size has a significant positive relationship in Mauritius but non-
significant in South Africa and Nigeria. While NED is a significant determinant in South 
Africa, is not in Nigeria and Mauritius. Similarly, high-leveraged companies in South Africa 
are more likely to comply with IFRS than companies in Mauritius and Nigeria. 
The R2 reflects how the model explains the relationship across the country in both scenario. 
The relationship between the dependent and the independent variable is better explained in 
Nigeria and South Africa than in Mauritius. 
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Insert Table 8.0. Sensitivity estimation results. 
  
Conclusion  
Using 205 non-financial institutions in 13 African countries over 3-year period, we have 
documented that the average WCS (UCS) compliance score among the companies over the 
period is 70.94% (73.09%), with a minimum score of 58.59% (62.86%) and maximum of 
83.55% (85.61%). Our study also highlighted the variation in compliance with standards 
(standard deviation of 6.99; 6.23). There is lower compliance with the latest standards, such as 
IFRS 3, 7, and 13. Also, IAS 17, 19, 36, and 37 are problematic across the sample. We also 
found that compliance has been increasing over the years. 
Our results show that there is a significant positive association between audit committee 
competence (ACC) and compliance, and the same for chartered accountants on board (AOB). 
On the contrary, there is an inverse relationship between ownership concentration (OWN) and 
compliance level. 
Our results imply that companies that appoint more Chartered Accountants to their boards are 
more likely to comply with the requirements of IFRS. Therefore, it is suggested that companies 
engage more chartered accountants in their governance. Also, corporate boards must strive to 
strengthen their audit committees by appointing more NEDs and CAs to the committee. As 
indicated in this study, competent audit committees ensure high compliance with standards 
such as IFRS. 
Overall, our results portray that IFRS is growing well among companies in Africa. Moreover, 
most IFRS-compliant companies have a competent audit committee (ACC) and a good ratio of 
accountants on board (AOB). The year-on-year increase in compliance level reflects the 
journey towards de facto harmonization of accounting standards in Africa. This study 
complements and updates prior studies on IFRS compliance with findings from Africa, a region 
which has been neglected in the literature. It provides evidence on how the characteristics of 
different stakeholders influence the company ’s level of disclosures.  
Consistent with Glaum et al. (2013), this study acknowledges the limitation of not being able 
to ascertain the causes of discrepancies in compliance levels between the years and among 
companies. As external assessors of published financial statements, we cannot attribute these 
discrepancies to either intentional or unintentional acts of the companies. Also, we could not 
estimate the impact of non-compliance on users of financial statements. 
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Table 1.0: Sample selection 
Item  Number 
Step 1 – Country selection  
Number of Countries in Africa 54 
-Removal countries which have not fully mandated-IFRS. (36) 
Countries that have fully mandated IFRS 18 
-Removal of Fully mandated IFRS countries without active stock exchanges (6) 
Selected countries 13 
Step 2- Company selection  
Number of Listed Companies in Selected countries 943 
-Removal of suspended companies (127) 
-Removal of financial companies. (371) 
-Removal of companies listed twice on Africa exchanges18 (123) 
-Removal of foreign companies listed as a secondary listing19. (58) 
-Removal of companies with unavailable data for the 3 years (59) 
Final sample 205 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 To avoid double counting, companies that are listed on more than one stock exchange among the selected 
countries are counted once. E.g. Kenyan Airways is listed in Kenya and Tanzania but is counted once. 
19 These are companies that are incorporated outside and listed on foreign exchanges. E.g. Bannerman is 
Australian listed company with listing on Namibia.  
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Insert Table 2.0 Checklist for calculating compliance score. 
Standard Tsalavoutas 
2011 
Delliote EY KPMG PWC This Study 
IAS 1 72 80 81 76 78 81 
IAS2 8 9 8 7 7 7 
IAS 7 10 22 17 26 16 19 
IAS 8 6 24 20 22 16 19 
IAS 10 6 6 3 14 4 6 
IAS 11 9 9 6 7 4 9 
IAS 12 11 25 22 24 20 17 
IAS 16 15 24 23 20 21 22 
IAS 17 19 17 19 18 8 12 
IAS 18 3 4 5 2 3 4 
IAS 19 23 28 29 30 24 25 
IAS 20 3 5 5 7 3 5 
IAS 21 9 11 11 11 8 9 
IAS 23 3 2 3 2 2 2 
IAS 24 18 26 25 28 24 20 
IAS 29 NA 5 4 6 5 5 
IAS 33 7 9 9 10 15 9 
IAS 36 39 29 28 26 34 30 
IAS 37 15 17 16 19 15 15 
IAS 38 14 30 29 25 24 25 
IAS 40 21 26 25 22 20 21 
IAS 41 23 27 29 26 23 25 
IFRS 2 12 17 20 19 16 17 
IFRS 3 20 24 26 28 23 24 
IFRS 4 NA 12 13 14 11 12 
IFRS 5 10 12 15 12 12 10 
IFRS 6 3 5 5 4 3 5 
IFRS 7 NA 25 22 24 28 30 
IFRS 8 NA 21 17 19 18 16 
IFRS 12 NA 37 38 42 38 39 
IFRS 13 NA 28 28 32 30 30 
  379 616 601 622 553 570 
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Table 3.0. Median compliance score by countries.  
 Weighted (WCS) Unweighted score (UCS) 
 2014 2015 2016 2014 2015 2016 
All countries 68.79 71.56 75.85 72.25 76.72 80.36 
Kenya 65.13 69.85 70.42 70.40 72.37 76.58 
Mauritius 75.72 76.11 80.71 75.52 78.39 82.56 
Nigeria 65.44 68.06 71.17 71.02 73.88 75.76 
South Africa 72.70 73.27 78.485 75.11 75.57 80.85 
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Table 4.0. Descriptive statistics of variables. 
Variables   Mean Median SDV Min Max 
Weighted score WCS (%) 70.94 71.86 6.99 58.59 83..55 
Unweighted score UCS (%) 73.09
5 
73.87 6.23 62.86 85.61 
Ownership  OW (%) 44.48 42.91 20.18 15.00 90.00 
Accountants on Board AOB 2 2 1.53 0 7 
Audit Committee 
Competence 
ACC (%) 72.53 75.00 22.5 20.00 95.00 
Audit committee size ACS 3 3 1.09 0 8 
Accountants in Audit 
Committee 
AAC 1 1 0.84 0 3 
Non-executive directors on 
Audit Committee 
NCC 3 3 0.   
Board size BOD 9 9 2.41 4 17 
Non-Executive directors on 
the Board. 
NED 7 7 2.26 1 14 
Total Asset TA($M) 1.02 1.20 8.01 0.0089 197.8
3 
Leverage LEV 0.65 0.58 0.03 0.0005 0.95 
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Table 5.0 Correlation matrix on compliance. 
  WCS UCS ACC NCA OWS BOD NCD AUD OWT TAA LEV 
WCS 1                     
UCS 0.8272*** 1                   
ACC 0.2111*** 0.1834** 1                 
NCA 0.0741* 0.1523* 0.5774***                 
OWS 0.3726*** 0.4017*** 0.5146 0.4801*** 1             
BOD 0.1701* 0.3339*** -0.0242 0.3400*** 0.2480** 1           
NCD 0.2216** 0.3650*** 0.1286 0.2695 0.3480*** 0.7673*** 1         
Big4 0.4997*** 0.5098*** -0.1065 -0.2476 0.0833 0.3018 0.3182 1       
OWT 0.1614* 0.1215* 0.4219 0.3714*** 0.3263*** 0.324*** -0.124 -0.136 1     
TAA 0.0778* 0.2302*** 0.2175* 0.2435 0.4655 0.3667*** 0.5710** 0.1282 0.1744* 1   
LEV 0.1745* 0.1164* -0.2545 -0.0522 -0.2232 0.2917 0.036 0.0791 0.3606*** -0.09 1 
Notes: Significant levels - *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
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Table 6.0 Estimation results on compliance. 
  M 1  
Unweighted (UCS) 
M 2 
Weighted (WCS) 
 Variable Coef  t-stats coef t-stats 
ACC 0.143 0.40** 0.17 0.47*** 
NCA 0.123 0.58*** 0.1 1.54*** 
OWS -0.0434 1.46*** -0.05 1.26** 
BOD 0.0127 0.67* 0.16 0.66* 
NED 0.023 1.7* 0.018 0.15 
AUD 0.022 1.3 0.2 1.77 
OWT 0.01 1.8* 0.006 2.59* 
EXP 0.02 1.34** 0.031 1.73*** 
TAA 0.052 2.39* 0.035 1.82* 
LEV 0.001 0.11 0.0001 3.17 
Constant 4.147**   4.185*** 
 
R-Square 0.2025   0.1089 
 
F-Value 20.46***   21.60*** 
 
OBS 615   615 
 
No. firms 205   205 
 
Notes: Significant levels -  *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
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Table 7.0 Additional analysis using percentage format of the independent variable. 
  M3 
 Unweighted (UCS%) 
M4 
Partial score (WCS%) 
  Coef  t-stats Coef t-stats 
ACC 0.051 1.00** 0.067 0.55** 
NCA 0.0727 2.77*** 0.089 0.12*** 
OWS -0.003 2.96*** -0.0045 0.43*** 
BOD 0.00246 2.44** 0.00198 1.33* 
NED 0.0017 0.56* 0.0011 0.34 
AUD 0.00523 2.00** 0.0035 0.34** 
OWT 0.00698 0.94 0.005 0.93 
EXP 0.008 1.53** 0.006 0.73** 
TAA 0.0247 1.77* 0.0232 1.64* 
LEV 0.001 0.73 0.001 2.85 
Constant 6.1 3.3*** 6.7 2.4*** 
R-
Square 
0.1925 
 
0.0905 
 
F-Value 15.64*** 
 
22.24*** 
 
OBS 615 
 
615 
 
No. 
firms 
205   205 
 
Notes: Significant levels -  *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
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Table 8.0. Sensitivity estimation results. 
 WCS 
VARIABLES Mauritius Nigeria South Africa 
 M 5 M 6 M 7 
 Coef Coef Coef 
ACC 0.012** 0.042** 0.13** 
NCA 0.015*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 
OWS -0.005* -0.003** -0.004** 
BOD 0.024* 0.016** 0.007** 
NED 0.025 0.008 0.005* 
AUD 0.003* 0.004** 0.005*** 
OWT 
 
0.028* 0.037* 
TAA 0.001* 0.002** 0.011*** 
LEV 0.001 0.001 0.004 
CONSTANT 4.26*** 4.59*** 4.37*** 
R-SQUARE 0.127 0.3268 0.3938 
F-VALUE 6.04*** 2.85*** 15.11*** 
OBS 108 99 123 
NO. FIRMS 36 34 41 
Notes: Significant levels -  *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
IFRS experience is removed because it is reductant as all the companies in the same country have 
similar years of experiences. 
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Table 9.0. Variable description and sources of data for compliance. 
Determinants Variable. Acronym. Description Data Source Expected 
sign 
 Dependent Compliance 
score  
 UCS/WCS Constructed using different harmonization 
scoring approaches (unweighted and weighted 
scoring) based on financial statements presented 
in company report. 
 Author own 
construction 
 
Definitive 
Stakeholder 
Audit 
committee 
competence 
ACC Measures the competence of the Audit 
Committee. It is the sum of existence, 
independence and having accounting or finance 
professional on the committee. 
Annual report Positive 
Dominant 
Stakeholder 
Accountants 
on Board 
AOB Number of qualified chartered accountants on the 
company board. 
 
Annual report Positive 
Discretionary 
Stakeholder 
Ownership 
structure 
OWS Ownership percentage of the highest single 
shareholding 
Annual report Positive 
         
 
control 
variables 
IFRS 
experience 
EXP Number of years since IFRS was allowed in the 
country 
Annual report Positive 
 Type of 
Ownership 
OWT Nationality of Major shareholder (foreign or 
domestic) 1= domestic; 0= foreign 
Annual report Positive 
 Board size BOD Number of board members. Annual report  
 Board 
Independence 
NED Number of independent directors as proportion of 
board size. 
Annual report Positive 
 Total Asset TAA Total assets in US$ Annual report Positive 
  Big4 Big4 Type of Auditor measured as 1=Big4; 0 = others Annual 
reports 
Positive 
 
 
 
